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DISCUSSION
Why Proportionality 
struggles when it comes to 
Power
Testing proportionality appears to be a thoroughly theorized 
method for legal problems of all kinds. It pervades domestic, 
European and international law, and the Treaty of the EU 
even extended this principle to matters of competences by 
Article 5 (4) TEU (see already Article 3b [3] EC Treaty).
Accordingly, Advocates General and courts have begun to 
rely more often on proportionality in powers cases, recently 
for instance in the OMT-case where a judgment is expected 
to be published next week. This blogpost agrees to the need 
for fine tuning of competences but it cautions against a too 
enthusiastic proportionality strategy. Being part of the 
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Union’s architecture of powers, Article 5 (4) TEU shouldn’t 
be construed in the traditional fundamental rights style, it 
rather demands a tailored homegrown methodology.
The need for a homegrown methodology of Article 5 (4) 
TEU
Having been a rather dormant clause in the beginning, 
courts (see here para 144 or here para 51) and Advocates 
General (see recently here para 159 [OMT], here para 123 or 
here para 90) increasingly apply Art. 5 (4) TEU, respectively 
the principle behind. However, and as opposed to its 
effectiveness in fundamental rights conflicts, proportionality 
as a tool to deal with competences remains quite toothless 
in practice.
That is interesting because we would assume proportionality 
to meet a strong need for fine tuning between conferral of 
power and “competence creep”. Those, however, who are 
familiar with German Constitutional Law, might remember 
the longstanding reservations of the German FCC to apply 
proportionality to matters of competences, because of the 
supposed inability of competences to be balanced.
The current OMT-Case illustrates some of these difficulties. 
While AG Cruz Villalón discusses Art. 5 (4) TEU at length 
over pages and eventually confirms the ECB’s competence, 
provided that it meets the proportionality requirements, the 
referring FCC relies on a sharp distinction between 
monetary and economic policy and avoids proportionality. 
No matter whether these differences are about methodology 
or strategy: proportionality as a tool to deal with 
competences is in any case worth to be considered more 
closely.
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The Principle’s Unique Function and Conditions 
Put in simple terms, proportionality consists of two 
components: there is a one-dimensional testing of the 
means and a multidimensional balancing of goods.
Assessing the means is for the most part a fact-based 
question, referring to its suitability and necessity to reach a 
goal. Balancing, in turn, relates two or more values. 
Establishing this relation is crucial for the balancing 
procedure because it creates knowledge we otherwise 
would not have. To give an example: Serious physical harm 
to a ten year old boy to keep him from stealing chewing gum 
sounds disproportionate. The same happening to a grown-
up intending to commit a bombing attack in a crowded mall 
tends to be fairly balanced. At the outset however, we can’t 
value “physical integrity” in itself or only at a very high – and 
therefore useless – level of abstraction. It is at first place 
only the relation between weight and counter-weight which 
enables us to approach its meaning.
Proportionality and Competences 
Notwithstanding its merits, proportionality is a demanding 
tool. It will deny its service if it is not fed with sensitive facts 
and competing values and it will leave us with misleading 
proportionality rhetoric if not operated carefully.
Let’s start with the factual component. The more complex 
and general political decisions are, the less courts are able to 
scrutinize these decisions. The discussion of the means, the 
alternatives, their functioning, and likeliness etc. rightly ends 
in acknowledging broad discretion of the respective bodies 
(e.g. here para 68 or here para 173, 187). To be sure, we know 
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this effect from the fundamental rights discourse, but that 
does not spare us from being aware of proportionality`s 
vulnerability also in the context at hand.
This point will become more serious, however, if we 
consider the low degree of sensitivity of competence 
matters to proportionality. When broad goals are at stake 
and competences are defined purposeful – as they regularly 
are in EU-Law – proportionality seems to ask the wrong 
question. Means and ends are conceptually entwined here. 
We observe this effect when it is not just about some level of 
protection of consumers, but a high level (here para 43); 
when it is not just about harmonizing health and safety of 
workers, but moreover about maintaining improvements 
(here para 66); or when strict requirements are (is anybody 
surprised?) deemed more effective than less strict ones 
(here para 55 or here para 34).
To be sure, that is perfectly fine! The Union shall perform its 
powers. The point is, we should not expect proportionality 
to decide every edge case.
Much worse, the tag “proportionate” applied to those cases 
carries a misleading normativity. It sounds like: “Look, it’s 
even proportionate!” and thereby perverts the function of 
proportionality to limit existent power and not to (never!) 
save shaky reasoning. We see this type of reasoning by the 
Parliament in the case of ENISA (here para 38 and 39), and 
some might hear such a (superfluous) sound in OMT when 
there is a close rhetoric connection between the 
competence and the exceptional circumstances.
Finally, where do we end up with balancing and the quest for 
values? Generally, competence is a formal concept: either 
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you have it or you don’t. To squeeze it into terms of value 
means to be challenged by a blur of categories, because the 
impaired counter-good now stands on both sides of the 
scale: when the Union exercises power according to the law, 
it potentially impairs Member States’ autonomy. In the 
absence of a “counter-good”, however, and with regard to 
the mentioned limitations regarding the facts, the 
significance of proportionality will not surmount the level of 
a loose rational basis test (which is fine as long as it is stated 
openly). Therefore, the AG in OMT is right when he avoids 
weighing diffuse competence-values in his three-step test. 
On the other hand, why did he not just skip this step 
completely? The reasoning there, including the point about 
insolvency and quantitative limits, is in essence part of the 
previous necessity and suitability test. Sure, steps and 
methods are not carved in stone, but if there is to be any 
effective “weighing” step at all, we need a commitment to 
weighable values, like Member States’ autonomy or sphere 
(e.g. here para 37 or here para 130), constitutional identity 
(e.g. here para 74) or fundamental rights. Facts themselves, if 
not referred to such a value, cannot be weighed in terms of 
proportionality.
From Receptor to an Originator
The mentioned problems are not to discourage 
proportionality review in the realm of competence. In 
contrast, we have to be aware that this well-known principle 
in effect is entering terra incognita there and needs 
adjustments. Let me propose three points to this end:
First, in delineating competences, conducting a 
proportionality test will never be as effective as in traditional 
contexts. To be sure, there is an intersection of formal 
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competences and substantial proportionality. As 
competences are no rights, it is definitely a limited one.
Second and to become more precise, courts should move 
from a toothless, deferential substantive testing of the facts 
to a procedural scrutiny of fact-findings. GA Cruz Villalón is 
therefore right in OMT to declare a detailed statement of 
reasons and facts as the very premise of proportionality (see 
here para 165 and already here para 53; similar strategy of 
FCC here para 335).
Finally, we need a discussion about the existence and shape 
of Member States’ goods, like the aforementioned autonomy 
or identity. Courts hardly discuss this crucial question. 
That’s appropriate in contexts of general rulemaking 
activities. The more values there are to be considered or the 
higher their level of abstraction is, the more will weighing 
lose its significance. Remember only the mentioned example 
of “physical harm”, compare it with the bulk of physical 
damages caused by road traffic and see how balancing 
changes its style. An infringement procedure against 
Germany may serve as a counter-example. The Court missed 
a perfect opportunity there to apply full proportionality 
when it formalistically relied on a “system for distributing 
powers” (here para 56) instead of using the high density of 
facts and the concreteness of impairment that may be 
caused by local audits (see also here para 90 as opposed to 
here). In such a case, we need not make conjectures about 
the idea of a Member State’s integrity as a concept because 
we know the circumstances, we can investigate the reasons 
and consequences. If that is not possible, in turn, 
proportionality will fall short of the expectations.
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The pervading language of proportionality and its 
effectiveness seem to function asymmetrically. What has 
been proposed here to deal with this imbalance, means to 
shift from a strong fundamental rights analogy towards 
proportionality as part of a smart interplay between formal 
and substantial tools to operate the Union’s architecture of 
power.
Dr. Michael Goldhammer, LL.M. (Michigan), University of 
Bayreuth; a longer version of the argument will be published 
in: B. Baade, S. Ehricht, M. Fink, R. Frau, M. Möldner, I. Risini 
& T. Stirner (eds.), Verhältnismäßigkeit im Völkerrecht (2016).
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